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Summary  findings
Driven by fiscal austerity and disenchantment with the  When governments establish good policies -
performance of state-provided infrastructure services,  especially cost-covering prices and credible commitments
many governments have turned to the private sector to  to stick to them - investors are willing to invest without
build, operate, finance, or own infrastructure in power,  special government support.
gas, water, transport,  and telecommunications sectors.  Privatizing assets without government guarantees or
Private capital flows to developing countries are  other financial support is possible, even where govern-
increasing rapidly; 15 percent of infrastructure  ments are politically unable to raise prices, because
investment is now funded by private capital in emerging  investors can achieve the returns they demand by
markets.  discounting the value of the assets they are purchasing.
But relative to needs, such private investment is  But this is not possible for new investments (greenfield
progressing slowly. Governments are reluctant to raise  projects).
consumer prices to cost-covering levels, while investors,  If prices have been set too low and the government is
mindful of experience, fear that governments may renege  not willing to raise them, it must give the investor
on promises to maintain adequate prices over the long  financial support, such as guarantees and other forms of
haul.  subsidy, to facilitate worthwhile projects that would not
So investors ask for government support in the form of  otherwise proceed.
grants, preferential tax treatment,  debt or equity  But guarantees shift costs from consumers to
contributions,  or guarantees. These subsidies differ in  taxpayers, who subsidize users of infrastructure services.
how they allocate risk between private investors and  Much of that subsidy is hidden, since the government
government. Efficiency gains are greatest when private  does not record the guarantee in its fiscal accounts. And
parties assume the risks that they can manage better than  taxpayers provide unremunerated  credit insurance, as the
the public sector.  government borrows based on its ability to tax citizens if
the project fails, not on the strength of the project itself.
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infrastructure project database.ITHE  GROWTH  OF PRIVATE  INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE
Following the debt crisis of the early 1980s developing countries significantly restricted public
borrowing.  The combined public sector borrowing requirement of all developing economies
shrank from 6 percent of GDP in 1982 to 1 percent in 1993 (figure 1).
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While public funding has been reduced, infrastructure investment requirements remain high.  In
1994 the World Bank estimated them at $200 billion a year for developing countries.  Since then
other World Bank studies have increased these estimates.  In East Asia and Latin America alone
average annual investment requirements through 2005  have been estimated at $150 and  $60
billion,  respectively.  Investment requirements tend to be  dominated by the transport sector,
followed by energy, telecommunications, and water.  Required investments often reflect excess
demand for services.  That is, consumers would be willing to pay more for services, but prices
are set at levels that are too low to attract suppliers.  (Telecommunications may be an exception,
as consumer prices exceed cost-covering levels in  several countries, albeit sometimes because
excise taxes are high.)
Driven by fiscal constraints and growing disenchantment with the performance of state-provided
infrastructure  services,  more  and  more  governments  have  turned  to  private  solutions  for
financing and providing telecommunications, energy, transport, and water services (World Bank
1994). The trendsetters were Chile, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand.  Deregulation of
many sectors-including  telecommunications,  airlines, independent power  generation, natural
gas production and transmission, and freight traffilc  by road and rail-began  even earlier in the
1United States in the late 1970s.  During the 1990s the dual trend toward private involvement in
infrastructure and deregulation has caught on in almost all countries.
Private markets are responding  with vigor.'  From  1990 to  1996 total net resource flows to
developing countries rose from $101 to $285 billion a year (table 1). Private flows rose from $44
billion to  $244 billion, while official development finance dropped from  $56 to  $41 billion.
Cross-border flows dominate infrastructure finance, even in countries with  very high national
saving rates, partly because of the benefits investors gain from diversification but partly because
of the underdevelopment of local capital markets in these countries.
Table 1 Net long-term resource flows to developing countries
Year  1990  1996
In billions  In billions  As Share  of Total
of dollars  As Share  of Total  of dollars
Total flows  100.6  100  284.6  100
Sources
Official development finance  56.3  56  40.8  14
Private flows  44.4  44  243.8  86
Recipients
Public sector  62.8  62  84.8  30
Private sector  37.8  38  199.7  70
Foreign direct investment  (24.5)  (24)  (109.5)  (38)
Portfolio equity flows  (3.2)  (3)  (45.7)  (16)
Nonguaranteed debt  (10.1)  (10)  (44.5)  (16)
Bond  (0.1)  (0.1)  (20.8)  (7)
Source:  World  Bank 1997a.
Increasingly,  private  capital  has  funded  private  projects  and  firms  rather  than  public
expenditures.  Between 1990 and 1996 public sector borrowing from private  sources rose from
$63 billion to  only $85 billion, barely offsetting the drop in official development finance. In
contrast, private capital (debt and equity) to private recipients rose from $38 billion to  $200
billion.
Total infrastructure financing raised by developing countries rose from less than $1 billion  in
1988 to more than $27 billion in  1996.  Finance for private infrastructure rose from virtually
nothing in 1988 to more than $20 billion in  1996 (table 2). Although the data on infrastructure
capital flows are not  strictly  comparable with  the data on capital flows, cross-border private
infrastructure finance appears to  account for about  10 percent of all private-to-private cross-
border capital flows.  About half of cross-border flows are invested from local sources in private
infrastructure projects,  so that  total  private  investment may  currently  account  for  about  15
percent of a total estimated investment requirement of $200 billion a year.
2Table 2  Private cross-border financial flows to infrastructure
(billions of U.S. dollars)
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Total  0.1  0.9  2.0  3.5  5.8  12.3  15.7  15.6  20.3
Loans  0.1  0.8  1.4  0.1  1.5  6.3  6.0  11.1  7.7
Bonds  0  0.2  0.5  0.7  1.1  3.9  5.8  3.3  7.2
Equity  0  0  0.1  2.6  3.1  2.1  3.9  1.3  5.4
Latin America
and Caribbean  0  0.2  0.3  3.1  3.6  4.7  6.6  2.1  7.8
Loans  0  0  0  0.02  0.2  0.3  1.6  0.7  0.7
Bonds  0  0.2  0.3  0.6  1.0  3.3  3.7  1.4  4.4
Equity  0  0  0.1  2.5  2.4  1.1  1.3  0  2.8
East Asia and
Pacific  0.1  0.8  1.5  0.4  2.0  5.7  6.8  8.8  9.3
Loans  0.1  0.8  1.3  0.05  1.2  4.6  3.4  6.1  4.9
Bonds  0  0  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.3  2.1  1.7  2.4
Equity  0  0  0.02  0.1  0.6  0.8  1.3  1.0  2.0
Source: World  Bank 1997a
Almost half of all private cross-border infrastructure finance appears to have been invested in
East Asia, and more than a third was invested in Latin America (table 2 and figure 2).  Power
projects have attracted the highest share of investment, accounting for more than 40 percent of
the total, followed by telecommunications and transport (figure 3).
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Between 1990 and 1994 private infrastructure finance to developing countries grew at an annual
average rate of 67 percent, reflecting the low base from which it started.  Since 1994 growth has
averaged 14 percent a year, well below the 19 percent growth rate of total private capital flows to
developing countries (figure 4).  (See also annex tables Al-A4).
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4WHY INFRASTRUCTURE  Is DIFFERENT
To understand why private financing of infrastructure has not kept pace with  overall financial
flows  to  private  entities  it  is  necessary to  recognize  how  infrastructure differs  from  other
industries.
First, infrastructure services are often considered essential by consumers, and they are frequently
provided  by monopolists.  Together these  factors  increase political  sensitivity  to  the prices
charged.  Pressure  from  consumers  to  keep  prices  low  makes  it  politically  difficult  for
governments to maintain prices that cover costs.  Indeed, the World Bank (1994) estimated that
user fees fell far short of costs in gas, electricity, and water.
Second, infrastructure projects typically require large sunk investments that take ten to  thirty
years  to  recoup.  Over  such long  periods of  time  investors  are exposed to  serious risks, in
particular the risk that public authorities will not honor their agreements on tariff policy and
payments to investors (Klein and Roger 1994).  Once investors are committed to projects-and
can pull out only by taking a huge loss-governments  may be tempted to  lower prices or not
raise  them  as  agreed.  Investors  thus  risk  being  the  victims  of  what  has  been  called the
"obsolescent bargain."
These factors help explain the familiar privatization-nationalization cycle that has been observed
repeatedly (figure 5).  Private entrepreneurs may initially develop infrastructure-building  the
first electricity networks, for example.2 As these networks expand toward territories operated by
other  entrepreneurs,  companies  merge  with  or  acquire  their  neighbors,  creating  larger,
consolidated firms.  These new firms are perceived as possessing significant monopoly power,
and the services they provide-once  considered luxuries-are  now considered essential, creating
pressure for monopoly regulation.  Regulation, in turn, reduces prices and profitability, which
discourages maintenance and new investment.  In the face of declining quality and a slowdown
in the industry's  growth, the government nationalizes the firn.  Low prices and inefficiency sap
the  finances  of  the  state-owned  firn,  obliging  the  government  to  subsidize  it.  The  very
availability of subsidies, however, encourages more inefficiency.  Eventually, concerns about
fiscal subsidies and inefficiency create pressure for prices increases and privatization-and  the
cycle begins again.
5Figure 5  The privatization-nationalization cycle
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Because  of the problem of sunk costs, and the historical  experience  of the "obsolescent  bargain,"
investors are typically unwilling to make investments without adequate, frequently  complex,
contractual protection (Dasgupta and Sengupta 1993; Edlin and Reichelstein 1996).  The
negotiation  of such contracts  is time consuming  and costly, however,  and even  the best contracts
cannot  p  ully protect investheorm synicatedts  of a deter  ined goverkns  ent.  Enforceability  of
these  contracts  is essential,  but it is difficult  to achieve. Investors  are condinually  faced with the
possibility  of changing  contractual  agreements  or failure by the govecnment  to implement  tariff
adjustments  because  of political  considerations.  Even if arbitration  and settlement  of disputes  in
a third country  are agreed  oin  radvance-such  as in the case of the Enron-Dahbol  power  project
in India-such  procedures  cap  contimitonsuming  and can add to the cost of the project.
The heavy foreign financing of infrastructure creates additional risks.  Most infrastructure
projects in developing  countries are financed with significant  amnounts  of foreign capital.  A
typical  financing  mix consists of 20-40 percent equity  (provided  by project  promoters)  and 60-
80 percent debt, in the form of syndicated commercial  bank loans, bond issues, bridge and
backup facilities,  and multilateral  and export credit agency loans and guarantees. Exposure to
currency risk, which is a  relatively minor concern for foreign investors in  export-oriented
manufacturing  industries, is a  critical feature of infrastructure  project investment.  Project
revenues are often generated in local currencies,  while servicing of foreign debt and equity
involves payrnent in  foreign currency.  Fluctuations in the exchange rate of  the domestic
currency,  as well as capital controls limiting currency convertibility  and transferability,  create
risk for foreign  investors  and financiers.
6While  prospects  for  currency  convertibility  and  transferability  have  improved  in  many
developing countries with the liberalization of their capital accounts and the surge in  foreign
capital inflows, the scope for exchange rate hedging and risk management through the use of
forward markets or  derivatives remains  limited.  With the  exception of Malaysia,  Thailand,
Brazil, and Mexico, where currency swap and forward markets have grown in the past two years,
foreign exchange markets in developing countries suffer from a lack of instruments and liquidity.
The case of the Argentine private natural gas transport company, COGASCO, illustrates several
of these problems.  COGASCO started operating in 1981, with a guarantee from the central bank
that it would be able to convert into hard currency its peso revenues from gas deliveries to state-
owned Gas del Estado.  In 1982 Argentina's foreign exchange reserves were low because of the
conflict with the United Kingdom, and the government  would have had trouble honoring  its
convertibility guarantee.  Gas del  Estado  then  reviewed  the contract  with  COGASCO  and
claimed breach of contract, complaining that COGASCO had found a more efficient way to run a
liquid petroleum gas extraction plant than foreseen  in the contract.  The dispute meant  that
COGASCO was not paid, mooting the issue of currency convertibility.  Because the investor's
costs were sunk it had little leverage with the government and the government was unable to
renege on its comrnmitment.  The dispute lasted until the late  1980s, when COGASCO and its
parent company went bankrupt and foreign investmnent  in the gas sector ground to a halt.
Because of this kind of risk, investors require high ex ante rates of return.  In many cases real
rates of return on equity exceed 20 percent (see annex table AS).  This often results in prices that
are higher than they were before privatization, when the real cost of capital was not taken into
account.
PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ATTRACT  PRIVATE INVESTORS
To render projects attractive to investors despite these risks, governments have to raise user fees
or provide special financial support to  projects.  Whichever route they choose, they need to
provide  credible assurances  to  investors  that  sensible binding obligations  (the  "rules of  the
game") will be honored.
Governments use an array of mechanisms to provide financial support to private infrastructure
projects (table 3).3  Some of these mechanisms, including preferential tax treatment, grants, and
equity  or subordinated debt contributions  for which  governments do not  expect commercial
returns, directly enhance project  cash flow.  In contrast,  guarantees are targeted at particular
risks, such as the risk that a state-owned party will renege on an obligation.
7Table 3 Types of sovereign  or supranational  support  for private  infrastructure  projects
Multilateral  Government  Informal  Multilateral  Government  Government  Multilateral  Government  Preferential
Banks and  Guarantees  Agreementsa  Banks and  Equity  Debt (Senior  Equity  Grants  Tax
Export Credit  Export  Participation  and Sub-  Participation  Treatment
Agency Debt  Credit  ordinated)
Agency
Guarantees
Country  Honduras:  India  Mexico:  Mexico  Peru:  Malaysia  Pakistan:  Philippines:  Brazil Linha  Chile:  450-
and  Electricidad  de  Dabbol 695-  City  Toluca Toll  Aguaytia  Kuala  Lumpur  Rousch  412-  Pagbilao 735-  Amerala  MW Empresa
Project  Cortes S. De  MW power  Road  145-MW  Sepang Airport  MW power  MW power  (10-yr., 15  Electica
R.L de C.V  plant;  gas-fired  plant CCPP  plant, coal  fired,  kIn, 6-lane  Pangue
(Elcosa  1 60-  combined  power plant  residual fuel  25-year PPA  road)
MW  oil fired  cycle;  oil; 30-year  with National
power  plant;  imported  PPA with  Power Corp.
15-yrs.  PPA  liquefied  Water and
natural gas  Power
(LPGYoiI  Development










Project  cost  $70 million  $922 million  $313 million  $235 million  $3,924  million  $507 million  $933 million  $174  million  $465 million
Date  1994  1995  February 1992  October 1996  1993  1996  1993  June 1996  1993
financial
closure
Example by  IFC:  $10.5 m  12-year  Concession  OPIC: $60  $390 m in  $40 m standby  IFC: $60 m  $112 million  $10 million  in
mechanism  senior debt  counter-  guarantees  m political  equity  loan by  ADB: S40  m  grant from the  deferred  tax
(LIBOR + 375  guarantee  traffic volumes  risk  provided  by  National  CDC: $35 m  Rio de Janeiro  duties
bps, 12-yr.  from the  by vehicle  guarantee  the  Development  municipal
maturity)  goverunent  category,  if  government  of  Finance  Corp.  government
of India for  traffic  volumes  Malaysia  (NDFC)
FMO: (Dutch)  tariff-  fell short  of  $140 m sub-
$10 m senior  payments  by  amounts  ordinated  debt
debt (LIBOR  +  the  specified  in  channeled  to
375 bps, 12-yr.  Maharashtra  contract,  the Pakistan
maturity)  State  Concessionaire  Fund from the
Electricity  entitled  to  World  Bank
IFC B: SlOm  Board;  and  request an  ($70  m) and
loan, 8-yr.  termination  extension  of the  JEXIM
maturity  guarantee  concession  term  ($70  m)
(capped  at  to permit







a.  Informal agreements include comfort letters, side agreements,  nonbinding tariff increases, and other
similar  agreements.
The  govermment's obligations  to  provide  support  can  be  defined  in  laws,  decrees,  statutes,
licenses, concessions, contracts  or other  legally binding  documents.  Most  countries have  also
signed some of the more than  1,200 bilateral investment treaties that define investor rights.
Investors and their counterparties normally agree on suitable methods for dispute resolution.  If
local courts  are not credible, the parties  can agree to  international  arbitration.  Most  countries
8have agreed  to international  conventions,  which establish  appropriate  arbitration  mechanisms  and
render  arbitral  awards  enforceable.
In some  cases counterparties  may lack the cash flow with which  to pay investors. Investors  thus
often seek additional assurances  that any compensation  due them under the terms of their
contract will actually  be paid.  For example, the central governments  may be asked to provide
assurances that  a publicly owned electric utility will honor its contracts with the private
generating  plants from which it buys power. Investors  may also seek guarantees  that their local
currency  earnings  will be convertible  and transferable  out of the country.
In sum, infrastructure  investors  require special assurances  that money due to them will be paid
when due, in the currency  they  require. In this sense,  all forms of government  support  ultimately
amount  to cash flow support  to a project and have  a significant  fiscal impact.
Support  through  Government  Guarantees
Governments often provide financial support by means of guarantees (box 2.1 and table  2.4).
Central governments often guarantee the performance of subsovereign entities, including public
enterprises and provincial or municipal governments.4
Box 1 Government guarantees in OECD  countries
Governments  throughout  the world provide guarantees to private investors in a variety of activities
Prominent among such guarantees are deposit insurance for bank depositors and pension or social
security insurance.  Guarantees for housing, agriculture, students, exports, and public corporations
dominate the picture in OECD countries; little is known about the make-up of guarantee  exposure in
developing  countries.  Even in OECD countries information  on guarantee exposure is sketchy. Data
suggest  that total guarantee  exposure  may amount to 15-20 percent of GDP, or more than a quarter of
gross debt.  This does not, of course, capture implicit guarantees, under which govermnent  may feel
obliged to bail out failing firms or banks or help uninsured citizens in need (in the wake of natural
disasters,  for example).
Guarantee  programs  can provide  valuable  support  for private economic  activity. But they can be costly:
in recent years several industrial countries have suffered large losses under some of their guarantee
programs,  including  deposit  insurance  and export  credits. During  the 1980s  OECD  export  credit agencies
incurred losses equivalent  to about 20 percent of new business,  while collecting premiums of only 3
percent. Most  of the export  credit  losses  were on medium-  and longer-term  credit. This  experience
prompted  a change in guarantee  management  procedures.  The United States has instituted  more
transparent  accounting  principles for its guarantee  operations  under the 1991 Credit Refonn Act.  The
experience  of export  guarantee  schemes  is relevant  for governments  considering  guaranteeing  long-term
infiastructure  investment,  as risks are similar (medium- to long-term  country  risk), although  the risk in
infrastructure investment may be  higher because of  the  risk  of  regulatory failure  or  creeping
expropriation  for firms with immobile  investments,  such as power  plants.
9Table 4  Types of government guarantees in private infrastructure projects
Type of guarantee  Projects
Contractual obligations of government entities
*  Guarantee of off-take in power projects  Birecik Hydro Power Plant, Turkey
Electricidad de Cores, Hungary Paguthan &
Dabhol Power Plants, India Mt. Aop
Geothermal Plant, Philippines
*  Guarantee of fuel supply in power projects  Termopaipa Power Plant, Colombia Lal Pir
Power, Pakistan
Policy/political risk
*  Guarantee of currency convertibility and  Lal Pir Power, Pakistan
transferability
*  Guarantee in case of changes of law or regulatory  Rousch Power, Pakistan
regime  Izmit Su Water Treatment Plant and
Pipeline, Turkey
Financial market disruption/fluctuations
* Guarantee of interest rate  North-South Expressway, Malaysia
* Guarantee of exchange rate  North-South Expressway, Malaysia
• Debt guarantee  Toll roads, Mexico
Termopaipa Power Plant, Colombia
Market risk
* Guarantee of tariff rate/sales risk guarantee  Don Muang Tollway, Thailand
Western Harbour Tunnel, Hong Kong
Buga-Tulua Highway, Colombia
Toll roads, Mexico
*  Revenue guarantee  South access to Concepci6n, Chile
M5 Motorway, Hungary
10Through central government guarantees, project risks, such as the ability of a public utility to pay
its private suppliers, can be transformed into countries risk. Countries can reduce their exposure
by  replacing  full  credit  guarantees  with  more  narrowly  defined  guarantees  such  as  power
purchase agreements.  Such unbundling of risks presumes that the parties can be trusted to honor
their commitments; if they cannot be trusted, investors will prefer full guarantees.  This helps
explain why countries with low credit  ratings rely heavily on full financing by export credit
agencies  or  multilaterals,  whereas  countries  with  higher  credit  ratings  offer  guarantees  for
specific risks (see table 2.5).  Support by multilaterals and export credit agencies appears to
substitute for an international contract enforcement mechanism.
Table S Patterns of sovereign or supranational support for private infrastructure projects
Number  Pattern
Multilateral Banks and Export Credit Agency  37  Greater  incidence  of debt  assistance  by multilateral
Debt  banks  and ECAs  in non-investment  grade  emerging
markets  (27).
Government Guarantees  28  Nearly  three  times as many  goverment guarantees
in  non-investment-grade  countries (24)  than in
investment-grade  countries  (9).
Informal Agreements'  28  Although  9 agreements  were issued  in Mexico,  use
of  infonnal  agreements is  more  common in
investment  grade  countries  (11).
Multilateral Banks and Export Credit Agency  26  Slightly  more examples among non- investment-
Guarantees  grade emerging  markets (15) than in investment-
grade  countries  (11).
Govemment Equity Participation  18  Greater  incidence  of  government  equity  participation
in investment-grade  countries  (I1).
Govemment Debt (Senior and Sub-ordinated)  14  Equal split  among  noninvestment-  and investment-
grade  countries.
Multilateral Equity Participation  13  Much greater  incidence  of equity share-holding  by
multilateral  barnks  arid ECAs in  non-investment-
grade  emerging  markets  (I1).
Govemment Grants  12  Greater  incidence of  govemnment  participation
through  grants in non- investnent grade countries
(8).
Preferential Tax Treatment  2  Limited use  of  preferential tax  treatment in
investment  grade  countries.
Note: Financing  packages  of 78 projects (39 power, 26 transport,  7 water/waste,  4 telecommunications,
and 2 gas) were disaggregated  and then tabulated  by type of mechanism  and source of funds. All 78
projects  has direct participation  by the private sector  through  the provision  of debt, equity,  or both.
a:  Informal  agreements  include comfort letters, side agreements,  nonbinding  tariff increases,  and other
similar  agreements.
Valuing  and Charging  for  Government  Guarantees
Guarantees provide (contingent) cash flow support to projects and are, in many respects, similar
to loans or grants.  To be able to compare all forms of assistance, it is useful to calculate the
subsidy implicit  in  each form  of  support.  These "subsidy  equivalents"  help determine, for
example, whether it is cheaper for the government to provide a guarantee or some other form of
support.  (For more on the role of guarantees in infrastructure finance see Dailami 1997.)
11The fact that government guarantees can be valued and may be expensive to government does
not  imply  that governments  should  charge investors  for the  guarantees.  When government
guarantees merely substitute for low prices, charging the full cost of the guarantee would defeat
the purpose of the guarantee.
When the guarantor can manage or bear the risk better than the investor, however, the value to
the guaranteed party is higher than the cost to guarantor, and the investor may be willing to pay
part or all of the cost for a guarantee.  Some commercial risks are insured by private insurance
companies for this  reason.  Governments, however, should not be insuring  commercial-  risks,
even on a fee basis.
To the extent that private insurers are willing to provide cover for political risk, they need to
charge for the value of a guarantee. Governments, however, would be extracting rents from good
policy by charging for such guarantees:  charging for political risk guarantees would be akin to
demanding protection money.  Governments should instead ensure that the benefits to investors
of  such  guarantees  are  passed  on  to  consumers-by  awarding projects  competitively,  for
example.
Complications Arising from the Risk of Sovereign Default
Sometimes the government's power of taxation enables it to honor any obligations it has entered
into to provide support to a private infrastructure project.  Official export credit and mortgage
insurance schemes in the United States are examples.  In some developing countries, however,
the risk  of sovereign default  is  real, and  its  implications  must  be  considered  in  structuring
government  support  to  private  infrastructure  companies.  The  key  task  is  to  evaluate
infrastructure projects financially within the country risk environment prevailing in developing
countries (see Dailami and Leipziger 1997).
When there is a risk of default, one or more creditors or investors may lose all or part of their
investment.  By obtaining government guarantees an investor or creditor obtains a position near
the front of the queue for repayment and secures access to sources of compensation not related to
the project, generally taxation.  By obtaining a supporting guarantee from an institution such as
the World Bank, a private investor can buy a place right at the front of the queue, benefiting from
the preferred creditor status of the World Bank.  It is not clear, however, whether such guarantees
simply improve some investors' positions relative to others' or whether it contributes to a better
overall outcome (see Dooley 1997).
The key issue is whether and how the structure of government liabilities may affect the outcome
of  government liability  renegotiations.  Even if  renegotiation  of  government  liabilities over
extended periods of time preserves the net present value of creditor or investor claims, there may
be real economic losses, since assets funded by investors may not be used as efficiently as they
would otherwise have been during  the often acrimonious work-out process.  For example, a
water concession may not be maintained as well during a dispute as otherwise.
12Different creditors or investors hold different types of claims.  They thus have varying interests
to negotiate.  Some "tough" investors may hold up renegotiation, thus imposing real losses (due
to the less efficient use of assets during the renegotiation), for which the tough investor does not
pay.  When a government issues guarantees to an infrastructure investor it tends to create yet
another type of claim.  In particular, the guarantee may be issued to an investor who has some
physical control over the assets.  This gives the guarantee holder bargaining power that differs
from that of a holder of sovereign debt, for example.  To some extent that may be justified for the
same reason that trade credit gets treated preferentially during debt renegotiations so as not to
disrupt basic economic activity with adverse consequences for all.
To achieve a solid and reasonably speedy settlement in order to minimize economic disruption
resulting from inefficient asset use, a mechanism needs to be in place that allows creditors and
investors to resolve their differences quickly.  This is achieved more easily if the claims held by
different investors are similar and the government has the flexibility to come up with various
ways of settling its obligations.
When a country properly accounts for its contingent liabilities and reserves for them fiscally,
they appear more like normal debt.  In fact, it may be preferable for the government to support
projects by providing debt finance rather than guarantees.  If so, it could be argued that, to
provide governments with the right incentives to do so, exposure under government guarantees
should be valued like debt and not be reduced by adjusting for probability of default.  In a sense
such an ultra conservative policy is equivalent to debt management policies in various advanced
OECD countries.  Germany, for example, actually values certain guarantees the same way as
debt with the same maximum exposure.
Beyond making claims more similar to each other, can a commitment mechanism be chosen to
facilitate speedy claims resolution?  The COGASCO example, mentioned earlier, illustrates that
project-based  renegotiation  can  last  as  long  as  sovereign debt  settlement,  with  deleterious
consequences  for  investment in  a  particular  sector.  It  may  therefore  be  useful  to  involve
multilateral creditors, because their interests and actions may be most closely aligned and they
may thus help advance resolution most speedily.
It is thus by no means clear that finely tuned risk allocation is always the right approach. Blunter
instruments, such as straight sovereign debt, may  at times  be preferable.  The argument  for
seeking  participation  by  multilaterals  may  have  little  to  do  with  the  nature  of  the  risk
management  or product they provide and  more with the role they are likely to play in  debt
renegotiation.
REFORMING  POLICY  TO  ATTRACT  INVESTORS
Although  guarantees can provide some  comfort to  investors, a  country's  interests are better
served by thorough-going policy reform.  The best way of attracting private  investment is by
establishing stable macroeconomic policies, adequate tariff regimes, a track record of honoring
13commitments,  and reasonable  economic policymaking.  In many OECD  countries and  other
industrial  economies,  such  as  Singapore,  investors  may  not  require  guarantees  or  other
government support, and they may be willing to accept "change of law" risk, which may affect
tax rates or other project cost or revenue parameters.
In many emerging markets, however-including  relatively advanced economies, such as Chile-
investors may not find the right policies in place, or they may doubt the government's ability to
sustain such policies over long periods of time.  Governments still have a variety of options for
reducing the need for special project support.
Projects are subject to country- and project-specific risks.  Risks related to a country's overall
health tend to be of prime importance.  Risks such as currency and interest-rate risks reflect
macroeconomic volatility and the risk that the government will not honor its obligations (country
risk proper).
That governments with stable macroeconomic policies can attract private infrastructure investors
more  easily is  reflected in  the  sovereign debt ratings  given by  various  rating  agencies  and
services (see annex table A5).  As country ratings improve, governents  are able to attract more
and more project finance (table 6) (although project finance accounts for only a small percentage
of GDP in the most creditworthy countries, where corporate finance is used to finance deals).5
Table 6  Credit ratings, deals per capita, and deals as a percent of GDP, by country, 1996
Country  Rating  Deals  per capita  Country  Rating  Deals  as a percentage
($/population)  of GDP
Qatar  BBB  8,564 Hong  Kong  A  13.5
Hong  Kong  A  3,229 Indonesia  BBB  7.1
Australia  AA  705 Thailand  A  5.7
Greece  BBB-  282 Chile  A-  4.9
Chile  A-  234 Pakistan  B+  4.5
United  Kingdom  AAA  227 Malaysia  A+  4.2
Saudi  Arabia  NR  214 Australia  AA  3.7
United  States  AAA  185 Greece  BBB-  3.2
Malaysia  A+  178 Saudi  Arabia  NR  3.1
Thailand  A  159  Turkey  B  2.4
Canada  AA+  151  India  BB+  2.1
Argentina  BB  99 Argentina  BB  1.2
Italy  AA  78 China  BBB  1.2
Germany  AAA  76 United  Kingdom  AAA  1.2
Indonesia  BBB  73 Brazil  BB-  0.8
Turkey  B  63 Canada  AA+  0.8
Brazil  BB-  37 United  States  AAA  0.7
Pakistan  B+  21 Italy  AA  0.4
India  BB+  7 Germany  AAA  0.3
China  BBB  7 Qatar  BBB  NA
Note:  Population and GDP data are for 1995.
Source:  Euromoney;  World Bank 1997b; World Bank staff estimates.
14Problems  with Financial  Support  without  Policy  Reform
The jury is still out on the consequences of government guarantees and other forms of financial
support:  although they may have increased the volume of investment, they may not have solved
the underlying problems.  Several examples illustrate the types of problem that can remain when
projects go ahead, with various forms of governments support, in the absence of serious policy
problems.
The Mexican toll road program generated several billion dollars of non-performing assets in the
domestic banking system.  No explicit guarantees had been issued to creditors, but local banks
expected the government to bail them out once the toll roads ran into financial difficulties.  The
government was forced to come to the banks' aid at the worst possible time-during  the currency
crisis of 1994/95.
The failure of private toll roads has caused problems in other countries as well.  In Thailand the
Bangkok expressway required government rescue after the authorities declined to raise tolls in
line with earlier agreements.  In Spain the government was obliged to pay out $2.7 billion when
exchange rate guarantees were called during the 1970s and 1980s.
Other  types  of  projects  have  also  been  affected.  Malaysia's  power  company,  TENAGA,
contracted with private generators (backed by a government guarantee) to  supply more power,
but consumer tariffs were left unchanged.  As a result TENAGA was not able to carry the full
cost  of  private  generation  forward  and  was  squeezed  financially,  forcing  it  to  negledt
maintenance and investment.  Power cuts throughout the country followed-exactly  the outcome
the new generation capacity was intended to prevent.
In  Mexico a water concession in Aguascalientes was concluded  in  1993.  To  guard against
currency risk, variable-rate debt financing was obtained in the local markets.  Water prices were
thus  not  indexed to  exchange  rate movements but  (partially)  to  changes in  interest rates on
domestic debt and inflation. Following the foreign currency devaluation in 1994/95 inflation and
domestic interest rates rose, which should have caused large nominal tariff increases.  A political
decision was made, however, not to raise tariffs as foreseen in the concession contract.  Instead
the government took on the financing of new investment that the concessionaire was supposed to
have made.
These cases have some key features in common.  First, problems were resolved by negotiation,
as they usually are in cases of government-related risks.  In contrast, disputes over technical or
commercial risks  are often resolved in  court.  Second,  the government  generally  ended up
bearing a substantial part of the costs-costs  that could have been avoided if the government had
allowed consumer prices to cover full project costs.
These  examples  reveal  how  the  basic  forces  that  drive  infrastructure  privatization  assert
themselves.  Private investors do not-and  should not-pay  for projects; they can only finance
them.  Either consumers or taxpayers have to  pay for projects in the end.  If the government
15cannot  raise  money  from  taxpayers,  consumer  prices  must  be  adequate.  Therefore,  when
privatization is motivated by fiscal constraints, user fees must be raised to cost-covering levels.
Projects that cannot be funded by  user fees should not,  in the absence of important positive
externalities, be built.
Government support could lower overall project cost only if the government had a lower cost of
capital than private parties.  Although government borrowing costs are often ostensibly lower
than private borrowing costs, governments borrow at lower rates not because they tend to operate
lower risk projects but  because taxpayers stand behind them, providing unremunerated credit
insurance.  If  taxpayers  were  remunerated  for  their  exposure,  the  ostensible  advantage  of
government  finance  would  presumably  disappear.  If  not,  governments  should  finance
everything,  including large  corporations-a  return to  GOSPLAN,  which appears  nonsensical
(Klein 1996).
Government support to  private  projects  compensates private  investors  for the  risks they  are
unwilling to bear given the prices they receive.  Investors may be  attracted to  infrastructure
projects without guarantees if the expected returns are high enough (that is, when rates charged
to  consumers  are high  enough).6 In that  sense the  search for guarantees  or other forms  of
government support is a search for suckers who can be made to pay what others are not willing to
pay.  Guarantees themselves do not appear to affect the cost of capital, which is determined by
the risks of the project, not the financing structure. As recent review of the effect of World Bank
partial credit guarantees (Huizinga  1997) suggests, the existence of guarantees did not reduce
nonguaranteed interest rates, and the duration of nonguaranteed debt remained relatively short.
Privatization of Existing Assets
Recent transactions have shown that even countries with subinvestment grade ratings can attract
sizable private investment without special government guarantees if  sound sector policies  are
made credible.  Privatizing existing assets reduces the role of government and with it fears of
noncommercial interference.  In Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia, for example, where certain sectors,
such  as  electricity, were  privatized,  private  investment has  been  made  without  government
guarantees.
Privatization also allows investors to earn high rates of return without raising consumer tariffs,
since investors discount the sale value of assets to the point at which existing tariffs generate the
required rate of return, rather than by raising tariffs, as they would have to do  in greenfield
projects.  In fact, tariffs can actually fall after privatizations, as they did in the Buenos Aires
water concession, in which the assets of the system were given to the private  investor free of
charge.7
Privatization has also attracted more equity investors than have new investment projects.  Since
equity markets are easier to develop than long-term debt markets in most developing countries,
privatizations have been able to  rely more on local  currency financing  than have greenfield
investment projects.  The typical  new  investment project  requires about  two-thirds  foreign
16finance, whereas  the  typical  privatization has  attracted two-thirds  of  its  finance from  local
markets (International Finance Corporation 1996).
Many privatizations have occurred in subinvestment grade countries (that is, in countries with
credit ratings of  less than  BBB-), including  Argentina, Peru  and  Bolivia.  Privatization  has
allowed  these  countries  to  attract  investment  despite  their  unstable  macroeconomic
environments,  allowing  them  to  make  the  most  of  existing  assets  rather  than  to  add  new
investments.
Greenfield Projects
Government guarantees and financial support are more difficult to avoid for new investments, for
which prices must be raised.  Well-structured project finance for greenfield projects may allow
governments to  avoid guarantees or other forms of  support, however.  Under project finance
investors  look  to  cash  flow  generated by  the  project  to  amortize  debt  and  to  pay  interest
payments and dividends.8 Project finance can help investors structure a project so that different
risks can be separated and allocated to the parties most willing to bear them.  An example is the
Mamonal power project in Colombia, where a foreign power generator sells electricity directly to
private firms at cost-covering prices.  This project structure has allowed the project company to
set high user fees and rely on payment discipline by creditworthy corporate customers rather than
on government guarantees.
Several countries  are trying  to  reduce  reliance  on  sovereign  support for  new  infrastructure
projects.  Most of the countries that have been successful in doing so have had investment-grade
ratings.  Indonesia  attracted  investors  by  issuing  comfort  letters  on  foreign  exchange
convertibility in  its  PAITON power  project.  China and  India have  declared that  they  are
unwilling  to  issue  sovereign  guarantees  for  private  infrastructure  projects.  In  China,  an
investment-grade country, investors  have  been  willing to  accept guarantees  from  provincial
governments in place of the national government.  In India, a subinvestment-grade country, the
verdict is still out, but it appears that projects going ahead require heavy backing from  state-
owned financial institutions.
Colombia, an investment-grade country, has been able to move away from sovereign guarantees
in projects in which ECOPETROL, the state-owned oil company, is backing payment obligations
(Centragas and Transgas).  Several Colombian entities have recently issued investment-grade
paper (for the El Dorado airport expansion and the city of Bogota).  Petropower, a Chilean co-
generation project, was able to issue bonds in the U.S. capital markets without the help of the
government or supranational agencies.  Although Argentina is not an investment-grade country,
Transportadora de Gas del Norte in Argentina was able to issue investment-grade paper with the
help of IFC participation (other innovative capital market issues are described in  annex table
A6).
17Rethinking  the Problem  of Future Investment  Requirements
The "financing gap" may in  fact be a "policy gap"-what  is needed is  not so much the
mobilization  of new financial  resources on a vast scale but a thorough-going  reform  of policy.
Raising consumer  prices to  cost-covering  levels would generate some $123 billion a year,
allowing infrastructure companies to  fund  most of  the  $200 billion  a  year needed for
infrastructure  from internal  cash generation,  leaving  only $77 billion  to be funded in the financial
markets (World  Bank 1994). In addition,  private participation  could create efficiency  gains of
$55 billion a year, reducing financing requirements  to $22 billion (figure 6).  Moreover,  the
increase in tariffs to consumers  should reduce demand and therefore investment  requirements.
To be politically  able to raise consumer  prices and to obtain the benefits of greater efficiency,
governments  should proceed with privatization. If they choose to go this route, however, the
long-run  financing  problems  will be minimal-financing requirements  from sources other than
internal  cash generation  may not be much  larger than  the existing  level of private capital  flows.
18Figure 6  Estimated cost of mispricing and technical inefficiency
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The shift to private infrastructure finance reduces the financing requirements of the country as a
whole only if private investors generate efficiency gains (that is, they provide the same level of
service at lower cost).  For efficiency gains to materialize the private sector needs to bear risks it
can manage better than the public sector.  As long as financial structures are found thdt shift
some of those risks away from the government-even  if limited guarantees remain-benefits  cah
be  obtained  from  privatization.  The  fact  that  privatization  reduces  the  likelihood  of
noncommercial interference by government can be the source of major efficiency gains (Gahlal
Tandon,  and Vogelsang  1994).
Managing Guarantee Exposure during the Transition
In the long run, governments  can attract private investment  in infrastructure  without providing
guarantees  if they have good policies in place.  The most difficult challenges  arise duritig the
transition from publicly  to privately  funded infrastructure,  when guarantees  are most common.
Even during the transition,  however,  government  guarantees  risk simply  postponing  the day bf
reckoning.  Assuming  that private investors cannot consistently be duped into investiing  itiunsustainable projects, providing guarantees imposes costs on taxpayers in the future.  For this
reason  alone governments should  develop ways  of quantifying  all their exposures to  private
infrastructure projects and reserving for them fiscally.
Two  governments in  the  developing  world-the  Philippines  and  Colombia-are  trying  to
develop ways to  manage their  guarantee exposure.  Both countries  are establishing ways of
valuing their exposure and creating fiscal reserves against it.  Managing guarantees correctly will
demonstrate the fiscal cost of not implementing good policies and help garner support for more
lasting reform.
Governments must also recognize their exposure from implicit guarantees. Ways must be found
to manage implicit guarantees by letting investors (at least equity investors) go under in case of
failure.  Mechanisms must be established that allow new investors to take the place of old ones to
ensure service continuity to consumers.  If this cannot be done, implicit guarantees should be
treated like explicit ones, and reserves should be budgeted to cover these contingent liabilities.
CONCLUSION
Governments can attract  private  investment in  infrastructure  in  two  ways.  They can offer
financial support to  investors-in  the form of grants, cheap loans, or guarantees-in  order to
compensate them for low tariffs, unstable macroeconomic conditions, poor performance by state-
owned enterprises, and other problems.  Or they can address the policy problems that underlie
investors'  concerns by raising prices to cost-covering levels, ensuring macroeconomic stability,
and establishing a sound regulatory framework.
Both methods can attract investors, but the provision of government support tends not to reduce
overall costs.  Instead, it allocates costs to taxpayers, who have no choice but to  accept them.
The costs of providing guarantees may be deferred, but they are real-as  the examples of the
Mexican and Spanish toll roads  show  so vividly.  In  contrast, policy  reforms  such as price
increases and the establishment of credible regulatory frameworks improve project fundamentals,
making them attractive to investors without imposing extra costs on captive taxpayers.
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22Table Al  Signed project finance deals, by country, 1996
Standard  & Poor's  Value  of  Value  of signed  Value  of
long-term,  foreign  Number  signed  project  finance  signed
currency  of signed  project  deals,  by  project
sovereign  project  finance  population  finance  deals
debt  rating  finance  deals  ($ million/  per  GDP  as a percent
Country  (March 11, 1997)  deals  ($ millions)  capita)  ($ millions)  of GDP
United States  AAA  103  48,669  185.0  6,952,020  0.70
Hong Kong  A  36  19,376  3,229.3  143,669  13.49
Indonesia  BBB  72  14,145  73.0  198,079  7.14
United  AAA  41  13,227  227.0  1,105,822  1.20
Kingdom
Australia  AA  44  12,731  705.3  348,782  3.65
Thailand  A  31  9,432  158.8  167,056  5.65
China  BBB  64  8,383  6.9  697,647  1.20
India  BB+  28  6,911  7.4  324,082  2.13
Gennany  AAA  9  6,236  76.4  2,415,764  0.26
Brazil  BB-  23  5,796  37.2  688,085  0.84
Qatar  BBB  3  4,710  8,563.6  ----
Canada  AA+  23  4,469  150.9  568,928  0.79
Italy  AA  6  4,443  77.7  1,086,932  0.41
Turkey  B  14  3,890  63.1  164,789  2.36
Saudi Arabia  NR  6  3,833  214.4  125,501  3.05
Malaysia  A+  13  3,575  177.5  85,311  4.19
Argentina  BB  19  3,447  99.1  281,060  1.23
Chile  A-  15  3,321  233.9  67,297  4.93
Greece  BBB-  2  2,951  282.1  90,550  3.26
Pakistan  B+  13  2,738  21.1  60,649  4.51
Note:  Population and GDP data are for 1995.
Source.  Project  Trade  and  Finance  Database;  World Bank  1997b; Standard  & Poor's;  World  Bank  staff
estimates.
23Table A2  Top ten emerging  markets  for project  finance  deals, 1996
Country  Number  of projects  Total project  value
($ millions)
Indonesia  72  14,145
Thailand  31  9,432
China  64  8,383
India  28  6,911
Brazil  23  5,796
Turkey  14  3,890
Malaysia  13  3,575
Argentina  19  3,447
Chile  15  3,231
Pakistan  13  2,738
Source: Project & Trade Finance March 1997.
Table  A3  Top ten emerging  markets,  1995-1996
1995  1996
Country  $ millions  Country  $ millions
Indonesia  3,384  Indonesia  4,306
Qatar  1,911  Colombia  1,557
Mexico  1,066  Philippines  1,097
Pakistan  1,062  Argentina  735
Turkey  929  Mexico  272
Colombia  660  Thailand  272
China  621  India  267
India  523  Chile  167
Chile  500  Poland  128
Hungary  397  Pakistan  97
Source:  Project Finance International 1995;  Project Finance International 29 January 1997.
24Table A4  Privatization transactions in selected emerging markets, 1991-1995
Infrastructure
Number of  privatization as a
infrastructure  Total number of  percent of total
Country  privatizations  privatizations  privatizations
Argentina  11,424  14,378  79.5
Mexico  4,958  21,278  23.3
Malaysia  4,248  8,735  48.6
Hungary  4,064  7,013  57.9
Indonesia  3,428  4,014  85.4
Peru  2,520  4,457  56.5
Venezuela  1,983  2,501  79.3
China  1,370  7,033  19.5
Czech Republic  1,361  2,297  59.3
Pakistan  1,011  1,565  64.6
India  973  4,447  21.9
Russia  787  1,255  62.7
Bolivia  770  811  94.9
Philippines  629  3,338  18.8
Brazil  491  9,606  5.1
Chile  403  619  65.2
Turkey  347  2,401  14.4
Thailand  t80  953  18.9
Poland  172  2,932  5.9
Latvia  160  160  100.0
Slovak Rep.  28  1,482  1.9
Estonia  6  245  2.6
Nigeria  3  176  1.6
Vietnam  1  3  22.2
Colombia  ---  905  0.0
Jordan  15  0.0
Kazakhstan  --  315  0.0
Oman  ---  62  0.0
Slovenia  ---  521  0.0
South Africa  ---  5  0.0
Uruguay  ---  2  0.0
Zimbabwe  ---  307  0.0
Total  39,583  114,964  34.4
Source: World Bank Privatization Database; International Economics Department;
World Bank staff estimates.
25Table A5  Sovereign credit ratings, country risk assessment, and sovereign defaults
in selected emerging markets
Standard  &  Moody's long-
Poor's long-term  term foreign  Institutional
foreign currency  currency  Euromoney  Investor  Years in default
sovereign  sovereign  country  country  since 1975  (foreign
debt rating  debt rating  ratings  ratings'  currency external
Country  (April 9, 1997)  (April 9, 1997)  (March 1997)  (March 1997)  bank Debt)
Malaysia  A+  Al  83.32  67.5  None
Thailand  A  A2  77.09  61.1  None
Czech Republic  A  Baal  74.54  62.8  None
Chile  A-  Baal  79.94  62.0  1983-1990
Slovenia  A  A3  73.97  52.1  1992-1995
China  BBB  A3  70.50  58.0  None
Indonesia  BBB  Baa3  70.95  51.6  None
Latvia  BBB  NR  55.04  29.1  None
Hungary  BBB-  Baa3  70.06  47.6  None
Oman  BBB-  Baa2  69.92  52.8  None
Colombia  BBB-  Baa3  63.68  47.7  None
Poland  BBB-  Baa3  56.58  47.9  1981-1994
Slovak Rep.  BBB-  Baa3  63.46  43.9  None
India  BB+  Baa3  64.61  46.3  None
South Africa  BB+  Baa3  69.88  46.0  1985-1987,  1989, 1993
Philippines  BB+  Ba2  63.14  42.3  1983-1992
Uruguay  BB+  Bal  63.42  41.7  1983, 1987, 1990-1991
Peru  BB+  B2  48.19  32.0  1976, 1978, 1980,
1984-1995
Mexico  BB  Ba2  64.14  42.6  1982-1986,  1988-1990
Argentina  BB  Bi  59.17  39.9  1982-1993
Jordan  BB-  Ba3  53.20  33.8  1989-1993
Russia  BB-  Ba2  43.97  23.5  1991-1995
Brazil  BB-  BI  59.11  38.8  1983-1994
Kazakhstan  BB-  Ba3  40.25  20.9  None
Pakistan  B+  B2  48.94  27.7  None
Turkey  B  Bl  53.39  40.8  1978-1981
Venezuela  B  Ba2  49.08  33.1  1983-1988, 1990
Vietnam  NR  NR  52.41  32.5  1985-1995
Zimbabwe  NR  NR  42.00  32.3  None
Estonia  NR  NR  53.21  33.6  None
Nigeria  NR  NR  26.78  14.8  1982-1992
Bolivia  NR  NR  45.93  24.9  1980-1993
Note: a  The scale for Euromoney and Institutional Investor country credit ratings range from 0-100. The
highest possible score is 100 and the lowest possible score is 0.
Source:  Standard & Poor's; Moody's; Euromoney; and Institutional Investor.
26Table A6  Capital  market  innovations,  1991-1996
Project  Location/
Year  Capital  Market  Innovation  Project  Country  of Origin
1991  Developer took long-term project risk.  Midlands Power Project  United States
1992  Project received investment grade rating and obtained  Sithe Energy 144A Bond Offering  United States
capital market financing in precompletion stage.
Project risk undertaken by developer in transport sector  Mexico City-Toluca Toll road  Mexico
project in an emerging market. Longer maturities.
Securitization of toll road revenues through offshore
debt fund for a 144a issue.
1993  Developer took long-term market risk.  Deer Park Refinery  United States
Pooling debt of multiple projects. Project financing to  Refinancing of Project  United States
receive an investment grade  Partnerships Owned by Coso
Energy
First IPP in Latin America  Mamonal Power Project  Colombia
First major private infrastructure project in Eastern  MI/Ml5  Motorway  Hungary
Europe. Project also did not have government
guarantees.
Project risk undertaken by developer in power sector in  Subic Bay Power Project  Subic Bay, Philippines
emerging market
1994  Construction risk was undertaken by project developer.  Indiantown Cogeneration  United States
Debt of multiple projects was pooled to provide  Energy Investors Fund Pooled  United States
liquidity for investors in an otherwise illiquid long-term  Portfolio Refinancing
fund.
Limited recourse refinancing of an IPP in the public  Kilroot Electric Bond Issue  Northern Ireland, United
bond markets in Europe.  Kingdom
Take-or-pay contract with state-owned utility allowed  YTL Power Generation Local  Malaysia
for much longer maturities (10-years versus 50 years).  Currency Bond Issue
First investment-grade project finance bond issue from  Centragas Bond Issue  Colombia
an emerging market. Construction and operation risk in
emerging market.
First financing in the U.S. for a Chinese power project.  LIPTEC 144a Bond Offering  China
Blind pool / power projects.
Rated Asian project financing of raising funds in the  Regco Project Financing  Thailand
United States.
Debt fund created to secure private loan. Eligible for  Rockfort Power Project  Jamaica
CARIFA bonds. Used multilateral bank guarantees to
fund IPP.
Market risk for power project in emerging market.  Alicura Hydro Project  Argentina
Discrete pool in emerging market.  Tribasa Toll roads  Mexico
Limited recourse financing for water and environmental  Chihuahua Norte Municipal  Chihuahua, Mexico
project. Indexed project revenues to inflation.  Wastewater Treatment Plant
27Project Location/
Year  Capital Market Innovation  P,cject  Country of Origin
1995  Privately financed undersea telecommunications cable.  Fiberoptic Link Around the Globe  23 political jurisdictions
18-country political risk package.  (FLAG)  between UK and Japan
Offering of limited recourse notes in high-yield notes  Califomia Energy Co./Salton Sea  United States
market.  Funding Corp. Debt Refinancing
Toll road financing syndicated in the equity and bond  M2 Toll Toad  New South Wales,
markets.  Australia
Power transmission and cross-border project with  Lineas de Transmisi6n del Litoral  Argentina, Paraguay
multilateral bank guarantees.  S.A.
Emerging market debt issue exceeded sovereign debt  YPF Structured Export Notes  Argentina
rating ceiling. Notes secured with a portion of future  Private Placement
receivables through long-term oil purchase agreement.
Debt fund established. Used multilateral bank  Hub River Power Project  Pakistan
guarantees to fond IPP.
1996  Capital market refinancing in an emerging market.  Pehuenche Bond Offering  Chile
Precompletion financing obtained by emerging market  Ibener Power Project  Chile
without political risk insurance, multilateral bank
support or PPA.
Latin American company to enter US 100-yr. bond  Endesa 3-Tranche Bond Offering.  Chile
market.
Long-tenn refinancing of project finance with  Paiton Energy Co. Bond Offering  Indonesia
investment grade.
Latin American r.municipality  syndicated loan.  Bogotd Syndicated Loan  Colombia
Toll road financing syndication in the equity bond  Guangdong Provincial  Guangdong Province,
market by a local government entity within an emerging  Expressway Shareholding  China
market.
Municipal government financing of greenfield toll road.  Linha Amerela  Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Source: Inter-American Development Bank 1995; Vives 1997.
The authors would like to thank Albert Amos, Anita Hellstern,  and Matthew Harvey for valuable  research
assistance.
The key sources  for the infonnation  presented here are Project Finance International  (1997), Sayer (1997),
Vives  (1997),  and World  Bank  (1997a).
2  Some  countries  may begin with  public  ownership,  but the cyclical  forces  are the same.
3  In fact, they have  been doing  so for some time. Land  grants and credit guarantees  for international  bond issues
were extended to railroads in India and South Africa in the nineteenth century, for example.
4  Such guarantees are primarily meant to support providers of  long-term debt.  Project fmancings are typically
funded with a very high share of debt, usually ranging from 60 to 80 percent of total project cost.  Reliance on
steady uninterrupted adherence  to scheduled debt repayment is key to the remuneration of long-term creditors, who
28do not benefit from the high returns that equity holders may expect. Guarantees of continuous creditworthiness are
thus of great value to creditors.
In project financing, debt often accounts for 60-80 percent of total project cost.  In contrast, corporate finance,
equity, particularly in the form  of internal cash generation, tends  to dominate funding. For a  discussion of
corporate  finance in  developing  countries see Dailami  (1992).  Project  financing has  also been  revived  in
industrial countries as a method of financing large-scale investment projects (see, for instance, Kensinger and
Martin [1988]; Chen, Kensinger, and Martin [1989]; and Nevitt and Fabozzi [1995]).
6  In some cases risks are so high that no investors will invest, and funding is effectively rationed.
7  There is no fundamental difference between a concession in which the government remains the notional owner,
as in the French water system, and a full asset sale, in which the government retains special supervision rights
defined in a license, as in the water privatizations in England and Wales.
8  Under corporate finance investors look towards the cash flow of the whole company that sponsors the project.
Corporate finance  allows project  sponsors to  use  other  existing revenue-eaming activities to  "collateralize"
investment in a project.  Various hybrid schemes exist such as project finance of a toll road expansion that benefits
at the same time from toll collection on already completed stretches of highway.
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